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IN THE SUPRE~ill COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
W. M. Bl\RNES COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs 
SOHIO NATURAL RESOURCES 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
formerly SOHIO PETROLEUM 
COMPANY, a Corpora ti on, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 1138 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action to quiet title in real property 
situated in Uintah County, State of Utah, and for damages. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
This matter came before the Honorable George E. Ballif, 
Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Uintah 
County, State of Utah, on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment a-
gainst the Appellant ordering that the Complaint be dismissed. 
The court further ordered that Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Appellant on Count l of Respondent's Counter-
claim be granted and Summary Judgment was therefore ordered 
quieting title to the land in question in Respondent. In grant-
ing Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment the Court held that 
the uocuments before the Court spelled out the transaction be-
tween the parties and established as a matter of law that said 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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transaction was a sale of the property rather than a mort ' gage 
thereon and that there were no issues of material facts to be 1 
determined. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the Lower Court's Order 
granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment reversed 
and to have the case remanded to the District Court for a trial 
on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, w. M. Barnes Company, is a corporation and is 
hereinafter referred to as Barnes. Respondent, Sohio Petro~m 
Company, is a corporation and is herEinafter referred to ass~ 
On September 1, 1969, Barnes was the owner of a 37 1/2 percent 
interest and Sohio was the owner of a 25 percent interest in~ 
is referred to as the Asphalt Ridge Properties, in Uintah Count 
State of Utah. As of said date they entered into an agreement 
along with others owning the remaining interest in said proper! 
under the terms of which Sohio was to hold the full interest ol 
said Asphalt Ridge Properties for the joint account of and inl 
for all owners of said property, consisting of approximately 5 
acres. Also in this agreement, commonly referred to as an 
Operating Agreement, the parties thereto agreed that Sohio sho 
be the operator of said properties. 
On October 7, 19 71, Barnes borrowed from the National Cit 
Bank of Cleveland, located in Cleveland, Ohio, the sum of $SOO 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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which amount with interest was due and payable on December 29, 
1972. Barnes pledged and mortgaged its 37 1/2 percent interest 
in the Asphalt Ridge Properties to the National City Bank of 
Cleveland as security for said loan, and $500,000.00 was de-
livered to Barnes by the bank. 
As security for said loan, Barnes, Sohio and the bank 
entered into an Escrow Agreement dated October 7, 1971, under the 
terms of which Sohio executed and delivered to Barnes on October 
7, 1971, and placed in Escrow with the bank a letter which is 
termed a Letter of Commitment. Under the terms of said Letter 
of Commitment, Sohio agreed to pay to Barnes at least $500,000.00 
for its interest in said Asphalt Properties, and to have a pre-
ference right to purchase said properties at a sum equal to any 
bona fide offer which Barnes may receive and be willing to accept 
at any time prior to December 31, 1972. Said letter also pro-
vided that Sohio should have 30 days after being notified by 
Barnes of any of fer in which to decide whether or not to exercise 
this preferential right. In addition to said Letter of Commit-
ment, the ES8row Agreement also contained a Conveyance and As-
signment, dated October 7, 1971, by which Barnes conveyed, as-
signed and transferred to Sohio all of its right, title and in-
terest in said Asphalt Ridge Properties. These documents were 
held in Escrow by the bank. The Letter of Commitment and the 
Conveyance and Assignment were required by the bank as security 
in making the loan. 
On October 28, 1972, Barnes received an offer from Prudential 
.~ Funds, Inc. to purchase Barnes' 37 1/2 percent interest in said 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Asphalt Ridge Properties for the sum of $500,000.00 in cash anc 
a 5 year promissory note in the amount of $ 2, 000, 000 oo bea · · 
• nno 1 
interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum on the unpaid bala:c:1 
and a lease of said property to National Energy Corporation fm 
a base period of 10 years subject to a royalty of 1/6 or $.GO 
per barrel, whichever was greater. On December 29, 19 7 2 Barnes 
gave notice to Sohio by telephone, by telegram, and by letter 
advising Sohio of Prudential's offer, and giving Sohio an op-
portunity to exercise its right of first refusal in the purc~M 
of the Asphalt Ridge Properties as agreed upon in the Letter cl 
Commitment referred to above. 
Barnes was not able to pay the National City Bank of 'Cleve 
for the$ 500, 000. 00 loan on December 29,. 1972 and the bank, ther 
fore, notified Sohio that the same had not been paid. On 
January 2, 1973 Sohio paid to the bank the principal amount of 
said loan together with accumulated interest in the amount of 
$444.44. The bank subsequently, on that same day, assigned ib 
interest under the Escrow Agreement dated October 7, 1971 W 
Sohio. 
Sohio is now and since January 2, 1973 has been the owner 
and holder of the banks interest under the October 7, 1971 
Escrow Agreement. On the same day that Sohio paid for the as-
signment of the bank's interest on the Escrow Agreement, the t 
d f . d C d Assi' gnrnent, datei delivere the a orementione onveyance an 
October 7, 19 71 which was held in es.crow, to Sohio. Sohio sir 
said date has held and continues to hold said Conveyance and 
Assignment in its possession. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Sohio refused to recognize and honor the offer to purchase 
said properties by Prudential Funds, Inc. as communicated to 
Sohio by Barnes on December 29, 1972 and has declined to ex-
ercise its preferential right to purchase Barnes' interest in 
said Asphalt Ridge Properties by meeting the terms of Prudential's 
offer as required in the October 7, 1971 Letter of Commitment 
referred to above. Sohio now claims to be the owner in fee of 
the 37 1/2 percent interest of Barnes in the Asphalt Ridge 
Properties by reason of the bank's assignment of interest in 
said property to Sohio on January 2, 1973. 
Never at any time did Barnes intend to sell the property 
to Sohio for $500,000.00. As evidenced by Prudential's October, 
1972 offer to purchase the property, the property was worth many 
times more than $500,000.00. Barnes, at all times, intended 
to repay to Sohio the amount Sohio paid to the National City 
Bank of Cleveland in relieving Barnes of its obligation to the 
bank under the October 7, 1971 loan agreement plus interest. 
Never at any time has Sohio recorded any conveyance showing its 
purported ownership in said property. 
The Respondent made a motion for Summary Judgment con-
tending that based on the pleadings and documents in evidence 
there was no geniune issue as to any material fact and that 
therefore the Respondent was entitled to a Judgment as a matter 
of law. Pursuant to the request of Appellant's counsel, a 
hearing was held on the 12th day of January, 1979 and the court 
issued its final ruling granting Sununary Judgment in favor of 
Respondent and against Appellant. Appellant now petitions the 
Court to reverse the order of the Lower Court granting Respondent's 
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Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
WHETHER OR NOT A PARTICULAR TRANSACTION WAS INTENDED BV i 
THE PARTIES THERETO AS A LOAN OR AS A SALE PRESENTS A· 1 
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A MATERIAL FACT, PRECLUDING THE EN! 
OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. II 
Summary Judgment under rule 56 of the Utah Rul.es of1 Civil I 
Procedure is a harsh remedy in that it prevents litigants from 
1 
fully presenting their case to the court, and is only proper if I 
the Pleadings, Depositions, Affidavits and Admissions, having 
I been viewed in the light most favorable to the loser, show that/ 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law"; sue: 
showing must preclude all reasonable possibility that the lmm 
could, if given a trial, produce evidence which would reasonabl: 
sustain a Judgment in his favor. Bullock v. Dessert Dodge Trucl 
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P. 2d 559 (1960). The very nat1 
of Summary Judgment has caused the courts to be very reluctant 
to invoke this remedy. Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 10 
Utah 2d, 353 P.2d 460 (1960). 
In discussing Summary Judgment proceedings under rule 56 tl. 
Utah Supreme Court in Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelit~ 
Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P. 2d 685 I 
stated that the sole purpose of Summary Judgment is to bar froi 
the courts unnecessary and unjustified litigation, and on~~ 
it clearly appears that the party against whom the Judgment wo' 
be granted cannot possibly establish a right to recover should 
such Judgment be granted. Any doubts should be resolved in fa Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered b  the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of such party when Surrunary Judgment against him is being considered. 
In an even more recent case, Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 
1266 (1976), the Utah Supreme Court stated that a Motion for 
summary Judgment provides a means for searching out the un-
disputed facts as shown by the Pleadings, Depositions, Admissions, 
Answers to Interrogatories and Documents before the court; its 
aim is to discover whether a controversy can be settled as a 
matter of law, thereby saving both court and litigants the time 
trouble and expense of a trial; but because the party against 
whom the Surrunary Judgment is entered is deprived of the privilege 
of a trial, the record must be carefully scrutinized to see 
if that party presents allegations which, if true, would entitle 
him to Judgment. If so, then Sununary Judgment is improper. 
In another recent Utah case, Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 
P.2d 191 (1975), the Court stated that it only takes one sworn 
statement to dispute averments on the other side of controversy 
and create an issue of fact, precluding Sununary Judgment. 
In no area of the law have the courts across the nation been 
more concerned about giving effect to the true intention of the 
parties and, therefore, being more liberal in allowing parol and 
extrinsic evidence to develop the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the parties' actions than they have in cases where 
it is contended by one of the parties that a deed absolute on 
its face is in fact a mortgage. Such are the facts of the 
present case. certainly, in instances such as those presented 
by the facts of this case where the intention of the parties 
has been viewed by the courts as controlling, Sununary Judgment Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitizati n provided by the Institute of Muse m and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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precluding the development of issues and facts by the parties 
at trial is improper. 
The following quotation is taken from 89 A. L. R. 2d 1041: 
The fact that an instrument is in form a deed absol t 
does not preclude the int7rpretation thereof as a mortga~e'. 
The in~erpretation of an instrument as a mortgage, or 
otherwise, presents a question to be decided from a 
consider a ti on of the whole transaction, and not from any 
particular feature from it. The characterization of the 
transaction by the parties in the instrument is not 
conclusive. 
The ultimate and essential point to be determined in \ 
every case in which it is thought to have an instrument of 
transfer construed as a mortgage is the intention of ilie 
parties or the object of the conveyance. To constitute 
a mortgage for the payment of a sum of money or the 
performance of some other act. . If intended to secure I 
an obligation, it will be construed in equity as a mortgage1 
and as possessing all the incidents thereof. · 
I 
That the issue of whether or not a deed absolute on its faci1 
was intended as a mortgage presents "genuine issues of material 
facts" which need to be fully developed by the litigants at 
trial thereby making the Summary Judgment improper in such a 
I 
case is clearly shown by an examination of the Utah Statute and, 
cases dealing with the subject. 
The position of the Utah Legislature on the issue of whetherl 
a deed absolute on its face was intended as a mortgage or a 
conveyance is reflected in the following statute: 
A mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a 
conveyance, whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner 
of the mortgage to recover possession of the real property 
without a foreclosure and sale. (UCA 78-40-8, 1953 as 
amended). 
Certainly this statute reflects the position of this legislature 
in preventing the inequitable forfeiture of property in cases 
dealing with fact situations similar to those of the present casi Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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In 1908 the Utah Supreme Court decided Duerden v. Solomon 
et. al., 33 Utah 468, 94 P. 978. This was an action brought by 
plaintiff to have an instrument purporting on its face to be a 
deed declared a mortgage, and the title to the real estate described 
therein quieted in plaintiff upon payment of the mortgage indebtedness. 
The court, after acknowledging that defendant testified that the 
transaction was not a mortgage but that it was an absolute 
purchase of the property, ruled against defendant and in favor 
of plaintiff and stated as follows: 
It is not contended that it was incompetent to show the 
real object of the deed by evidence aliunde the instrument. 
It is conceded that in cases such as this courts of equity 
will look beyond the terms of the instrument to the real 
transaction, and, when that is to be shown to be one of 
security and not of sale, they will give effect to the 
actual contract of the parties, and that the rule which 
excludes parol evidence to contradict or vary written 
instruments does not forbid an inquiry into the object 
of the parties in executing and receiving the instrument. 
Whether the instrument should be treated as a deed or 
mortqage of course depends upon the facts and circum-
stances of the transaction, the object_ and purpose for which 
it was given and received and whether it was given as 
security or for a bargain and sale of the land. 
In addition to the above-quoted factors the court noted 
the existence of other "material facts" that had been developed 
at trial in determining whether or not the transaction was 
intended by the parties to be a mortgage or an absolute sale 
and purchase, and stated: 
The receipts and book entries are strong corroborative 
evidence of the claim made by plaintiff that the transaction 
had between him and the defendant was that of a loan, and 
that there existed a continuing indebtedness. There was 
also evidence showing that the value of the land was gr7atly 
in excess of the amount paid by the defendant and that it 
increased in value more than 25 percent. 
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In Hess v. Anger, 53 Utah 186, 177 P. 232 ( 1918), an act; 
brought to have a deed absolute in form declared a t mor gage, 
and the same foreclosed the defendant~ as security to thep~ 
for all liabilities that might be incurred by the plaintiff~ 
the transaction, conveyed by deed a 74 acre farm to the p~~ 
The court, in holding that the transaction was a mortgnge, I 
quoted the exact language of the plaintiff and defendants de.J 
·1 
oped at trial with respect to the giving of the deed and sw 
In our state a deed absolute in form, executerl. and: 
delivered as security under a parol agreement and wiUt 
understanding that it shall be so held, will be construe: 
as a mortgage. 
Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940 ( 1933), was a:I 
action to impress the property involved with the trust in fav:j 
of the plo.intiff subject to a mortgage lien, notwithstanding' 
the absolute form of the conveyances, in which the court a~~ 
held for the plaintiff and against the defendant. In reachir,: 
'1 
its decision the court examined the testimony of the parti~ I 
given at trial including the testimony of the plaintiff that 
she gave the deed to the defendant as collateral and that ~ 
did not intend to part with title and ownership of the propert: 
In stressing the importance of fully developing the nature~ 
the transaction involved through testimony and other evidP~ 1 
! 
trial the court said: 
. ht) In an equity case, and particularly one in whic "/ 
testimony is of such character that it is necessar~ fo'. ,,i 
the trial court to base Findings of Fact upon imp11cat10", 
relations and behavior of the parties, and to ~eter~~' 
the intention accompanying certain acts, relations, P 
behavior, it is often difficult for a trial court to ,, 
determine before the issues are well developed, as a tr.-·, 
proceeds, what testimony is material or relevant and 
what is not. 
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The court then continued by saying that "the testimony must 
be considered and weighed for the purpose of determining what 
the nature and purposes of the instrument were." The court then 
indicated that: 
In examining the evidence for the purpose of determining 
whether the.deed is what upon its face it purports to be, 
or whether it is a mortgage or an unconditional or a 
conditional sale or imposed a trust ... or otherwise, 
parol evidence, extrinsic circumstances, and the relationship 
of the parties may be resorted to, not for the purpose 
of varying the terms of the written instrument, but for 
the purpose of showing the object and purpose for which 
the conveyance was made. (Emphasis added). 
It is an established doctrine that a court of equity 
will treat a deed, absolute in form.as a mortgage, when 
it is executed as security for a loan of money. That 
court looks beyond the terms of the instrument to the 
real transaction; and when that is shown to be one of 
security, and not of sale, it will give effect to the 
actual contract of the parties. As the equity, upon 
which the court acts in such cases, arises from the real 
character of the transaction, any evidence, written or 
oral, tending to show this is admissible. 
In determining whether the deed in this case, absolute 
in its terms, was intended as a mortgage, the court listed 
the essential elements, or "material facts, to be considered." 
~ong these "material facts" are the following: 
Whether or not there was a continuing obligation 
on the part of the granter to pay the debt or meet the 
obligation which it is claimed the deed was made to secure; 
the question of relative value; the contemporaneous and 
subsequent acts; the declarations and admissions of the 
parties· the form of the written evidences of the trans-
actions'. the nature and character of the testimony relied 
upon; the various business, social, or other relationship 
of the parties; and the apparent aims and purposes to be 
accomplished. 
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The court in holding that the transaction in question was 
intended to secure a debt rather than as an absolute sale al~I 
looked to the testimony of the parties and other evidence intrc: 
at trial regarding that the value of the property involved, ~I 
testimony as to the value of said property given on behalf~~ 
plaintiffs and defendants ranged from a valuation of $54,500 to 
$104,000. The indebtedness to the defendant for which the deei 
was given was approximately $48,000. The court stated that tt.E:, 
was a "substantial" difference between the total indebtedness 
owed by plaintiff to defendant and the value of the proper~ 
at the time of the conveyance which pointed to the fact that t:.' 
transaction was intended as security for a debt rather thanu 
an outright sale. 
Subsequent Utah cases have all followed the guidelines se'. 
for th in Corey v. Roberts (Supra) in determining whether a tran: 
action was intended merely as security for the payment of a deb~ 
or as a sale. In all of these cases the court has looked beyon1 
the terms of any written instruments in an effort to determine 
the real character of the transaction and the intention of t~ 
parties involved. In Brown v. Skeen, 58 P. 2d 24, 89 Utah 568 
(1936), the court quoted from Story Eq. Jur. section 1018 
language that "the particular form or words of the conveyan~ 
are unimportant" but rather that the intent of the parties to 
the transaction is controlling. The court then, in emphasisin! 
the importance of extrinsic evidence in determining the real 
character of the transaction involved, cited Utah Code AnnoUb 
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section 78-40-8 which provides that "a mortgage of real 
property shall not be deemed a conveyance, whatever its terms, 
so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to recover possession 
of the real property without a foreclosure and sale." The court 
then commented on this particular section of the code and stated 
that it has "been many times referred to in the cases and construed. 
A deed absolute in form may be shown to be a mortgage when it 
is shown to be an instrument of security rather than one of sale." 
The court in Thornley Land and Livestock Company v. Gailey, 
105 Utah 519, 143 P.2d 283 (1943), although holding that the 
transaction in question was a sale and not a mortgage, stated 
that the controlling question in such a case was "what was the 
situation of the parties and what was their intention" at the 
time the agreement was executed. The court continued by saying: 
.It is not clear from the terms of the agreement whether 
or not there was an obligation from plaintiff to defendant. 
existing after the execution of the agreement. There is no 
evidence as to relative values. A consideration of the 
acts of the parties must in this instance be coupled with 
and include their relationship and the apparent aims 
and purposes to be accomplished. 
The courts' statement that the controlling question in 
determining whether a deed is a mortgage i~ the parties intention 
at the time of execution and delivery of the instrument was 
stated by the court earlier that same year (1943) in Gibbons 
v. Gibbons, 103 Utah 266, 135 P.2d 105 (1943). In holding 
that a warranty deed, absolute in form, was not an absolute 
conveyance of land to the grantee, but a mortgage in view of 
the parties' contemporaneous written agreement providing that 
llie conveyance was made to enable the grantee to obtain a loan 
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I 
on premises for a sum to be used in paying the mortgage th I 
erec:, 
and that, if the grantor desired to sell the land the · grantee : 
would convey title to the purchaser on payment to the grantee 
of such amount, the court stated that "the fact that by the 
terms of the contract, defendant had the right to sell the~~ 
to a third person, clearly indicated the intention of the part 
that title should not pass to the defendant." The court then 
continued by terming transactions wherein a deed absolute upo;, 
its face has been shown by parol evidence to have been given i:: 
security purposes only as "equitable mortgages." 
In 1972 the Supreme Court decided a case with issues "~ 
similar to those involved in the case at hand. In this 1972 
case, Kjar v. Brimley, 27 Utah 2d, 411, 497 P.2d 23, plaintifu 
were in default on a mortgage on their home and, when i..;nable I 
to refinance the ob ligation through the institutional mortgagee,\ 
were approached by defendants who proposed to refinance by 
means of a security agreement in the form of an absolute 
deed with an option to repurchase. Plaintiffs contended that 
the parties intended from its inception that the transact~n 
was a loan, secured by a mortgage on plaintiffs' home. 
Defendants urged that the transaction was a conditional sale, i.', 
a sale with an option to repurchase at an advance price. 
Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment which was 
granted by the trial court, and from which plaintiffs appealed. 1 
This case, therefore, came to the Supreme Court on an appeal 
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from the lower court's granting of defendants Motion for summary 
Judgment. 
The court, in holding that under the circumstances of the 
case, there was a "material issue of fact as to whether the 
parties intended to create a debtor-creditor relationship and 
whether the alleged sale was intended to be no more than a 
security transaction", reversed the Judgment of the trial 
court and remanded the case for a trial on the merits. In so 
doing the court stated: 
In equity, a deed, absolute on its face, may be shown 
by parol evidence to have been given for security purposes 
only; and if such showing be made, equity will give effect 
to the intention of the parties. 
The court continued by stating: 
Whether a transaction in the form of a sale with an 
option to repurchase is in fact a sale, or a loan •• 
is an issue for the trier of fact. The controlling 
question is what was the intention of the parties as it 
existed at the time of the execution and delivery of 
the instrument? 
In determining the "material facts", to be decided by the 
trier of fact the Utah Court stated: 
If by the terms of the contract the granter has the 
right to sell to a third person, such a fact is a clear 
indication of the intention of the parties that title 
should not pass to the grantee. 
The court continued: 
If there be a large margin between the debt or sum 
advanced and the value of the land conveyed, this represents 
an assurance of payment stronger than any promise or bond 
of a necessitous borrower or debtor. 
In Rizo v. Macbeth, Alaska, 398 P.2d 209 (1965), the 
court decided circumstances relevant to the determination 
of whether an instrument was a deed or a security device: 
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.the adequacy or inadequacy of consideration as 
compared to the value of the property, which is often 
stated to be the single most important factor. Retent 
t ' f · lOr. or nonre ention o possession. The conduct of the part' 
before and after the execution of the instrument. The lei 
financial condition of grantor at the time of execution 
of the instrument. The over-all relationship of the 
parties--f inancial business, debtor-creditor, etc. Wheu, 
the grantor or grantee paid the taxes. The construction .. 
of improvement after the execution of the deed. Whether 
or not revenue stamps were affixed to the instrument. 
There are others. Generally it can be said that no 0~ 
of the circumstances is necessarily controlling, but 
that all present are to be considered.' 
The conclusion of the court was that "the disputed issues 
as to material facts raised by the Pleadings, Interrogatories, 
and the Affidavit were sufficient so as to preclude the tr~! 
court from granting Summary Judgment under Rule 56, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
High Courts in states other than Utah have also ruled that 
in determining whether an instrument in form an absolute deed 
was intended as a mortgage, inadequacy of consideration, or 
the fact that the value of the property was greater than t~ 
consideration for the deed, is a circumstance tending to show 
that the deed was intended to operate as a mortgage. In 
Klingensmith v. Klingensmith, 193 Iowa 350, 185 N.W. 75 (1921), 
plaintiff had borrowed sums aggregating about $900 from banks 
by giving notes on which his father, since deceased, signed as 
surety. The father's estate consisted of $28,000 in real 
property, and personal property of the value of $2,500. prior 
t hi~ 
to his father's death, plaintiff had executed to defendan 51 
four brothers and sisters, a Quit Claim Deed of his expected 
interest in the father's estate, when the banks pressed for 
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payment of the notes and such defendants lent plaintiff money 
to pay off the notes. Plaintiff contended that the Quit Claim 
deed was executed as security for the aforesaid advances, and 
defendants contended that the instrument was an absolute 
conveyance. The court, in affirming a decree finding the 
equities in favor of plaintiff in his suit to have the purported 
deed cancelled and to have it construed as security for the 
advances, after considering all the evidence, including that 
detailed above, said: 
When we compare the consideration in fact given 
with the actual value of Ed's share in the decedent's 
property it is grossly inadequate, and sufficient to charge 
defendants with constructive fraud in their attempt to 
preclude the rights of Edward •... the mathematics of 
this case show that the plaintiff parted with about 
$6,000 in value for consideration of less than $1,000. 
Equity refuses to recognize such inequality. 
The court said that it was clear that the Quit Claim Deed 
did not express the true agreement between the parties, even 
though it is conceded that Edward knew that he was signing a 
Quit Claim Deed in the first instance, Edward himself not in-
tending it to be other than a mere security in the event he 
ever inherited anything from his father. The court said that 
defendants were entitled to take the monies, with interest, 
advanced by them on Edward's behalf, but to take more would 
be obnoxious to every sens~ of fairness, honesty, and right. 
In this connection the court quoted from Stone v. Moody, 41 
Washington 680, 84 P. 617, 85 P. 346, (1906), where it was said: 
we do not believe that a court in equity should 
hesitate to interfere even though the victimized parties 
owe their predicament largely to their own stupidity and 
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Also, in Mattes v. Smith, 149 Oregon 93,39 P.2d 676 (19431 , 
the court held an instrument to be a mortgage rather than a 
deed where, in addition to other circumstances detailed by t~ 
court, the property, reasonably worth $32,000 and encumbered 
by a mortgage of $1,000, was conveyed to defendants by plainti~ 
by an instrument, in the form of a deed, for the sole considerat:: 
$400, and it appeared also, at the time of the execution of 
the instrument, the plaintiffs also executed a note in favor 
of defendants of $400, and defendants as part of the same 
transaction gave plaintiffs a 90 day option to purchase the 
land for the amounts specified in the note. The court stated 
that it was highly improbable that plaintiffs would sell the 
property in question for $400, and concurred in the opinion of 
the trial Judge that there was no intention on the part of 
plaintiffs to sell, or on the part of defendants to buy. 
The foregoing examination of cases and authorities serves 
to show the "material facts" examined by the court in determinin; 
whether a transaction was intended as an instrument of security 
or as an instrument of sale. Certainly, with the courts 
placing such great emphasis in these cases on the intentions of 
the parties involved and the real character of the transaction 
and in considering the courts policy against forfeiture, it 
would be a rare instance where Summary Judgment would be 
appropriate under facts similar to those in the cases above 
cited. Such is the case in Barnes v. Sohio. 
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During the oral arguments which were held by the court 
on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in this case, Judge 
Ballif commented from the bench that because in this case the 
language appearing within the four corners of the documents 
involved was unambiguous, parol and extrinsic evidence could 
not be considered in determining the true nature of the 
transaction involved. This is certainly not the position 
other courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, have taken. 
The forfeiture of property is a serious matter and certainly 
presents issues which cannot be determined on Summary Judgment 
by an examination of the language contained within the four 
corners of the instruments involved. 
On factual issue that needs to be resolved through the 
means of all discovery procedures legally available to the parties, 
including trial, and over which there is a dispute in this case 
as evidenced by the Pleadings and other documents on file herein, 
is the intentions of the parties to the transaction at the time 
the agreement was executed. Barnes in its complaint, states that 
it pledged and mortgaged its 37~ percent interest in the Asphault 
Ridge Properties to the National City Bank of Cleveland as 
security for said loan the bank required Sohio to execute and 
deliver to the bank the letter which has been termed a Letter 
of Commitment. Barnes states that at no time did it intend to 
sell the property to Sohio for $500,000. Sohio, on the other 
hand, claims that the transaction was an out right sale of the 
property. 
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On page 65 of the Deposition of W. M. Barnes, President~ 
the plaintiff corporation, taken on the 17th day of March, 
197!, 
Mr. Barnes explains his understanding of the agreement: 
Q. Now was it your understanding that you had signed a 
conveyance when you entered into the Escrow Agree~nD 
A. It was my understanding that I pledged my 37~ percent 
interest in the Asphault Ridge Properties to guarantee: 
a note that I had issued for $500,000 for the company.' 
Mr. Barnes also testified that Mr. Harry Pforzaheimer 
representing Sohio suggested to him that the way to handle a 
transaction was for the parties to execute the Letter of 
Commitment to show that the property was worth at least that 
much money, namely, $500,000. Based on said letter, the ba~ 
would loan the money. 
Certainly, this testimony of W. M. Barnes and the allegatio,. 
contained in the Pleadings on file in this case raise an issueo'. 
"material fact" which cannot be determined by the court on 
Summary Judgment. Another issue of fact over which there is a 
dispute in this case and which makes Summary Judgment inappropria 
is the actions of the parties subsequent to the transaction 
involved. In this case, the treatment by the bank of the note 
after it had been paid by Sohio is interesting. Item 5 of 
defendants memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment sets forth a copy of the note on page 1, and on the 
second page sets forth the endorsement by the bank on the note 
when it was paid and states: 
Assigned to Sohio Petroleum Company without recourse, 
The National City Bank of Cleveland. By G. F. Carpenter, 
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As further evidence of what the bank did and its under-
standing of the agreement it wrote a letter to Barnes on 
January 4, 1973, which appears as defendants exhibit DB in 
w. M. Barnes' Deposition and is item 8 in Sohio's Memorandum. 
In this letter to Mr. Barnes the bank states: 
In accordance with the Escrow Agreement between our 
bank, yourself and the Sohio Petroleum Company, we notified 
Sohio Petroleum Company on December 29, 1972, that,the 
$500,000 note had not been paid, and we, therefore, 
assigned the note for $500,000 to the Sohio Petroleum 
Company without recourse to this bank on January 2, 1973. 
The testimony of a disinterested third party as t0 its 
understanding of the transaction between Barnes and Sohio would 
certainly be helpful to the court in ascertaining the intentions 
of the parties at the time they entered into the transaction 
and certainly presents an issue of material fact precluding 
the entry of Summary Judgment. 
Another issue of material fact to be decided in. this case is 
a comparison of the value of the property described in the deed 
with the amount of the debt. In its Complaint Barnes alleges 
that Prudential Fund, Inc. had offered to purchase the 37~ 
percent interest of Barnes in the Asphault Ridge Properties 
for $500,000 cash and a five year promissory note in the amount 
of 2 million dollars bearing interest ,a,.t 6 percent per annum 
on the unpaid balance. This allegation is supported by W. M. 
Barnes' Deposition pages 51-60 wherein he testified as to the 
terms of the deal between Barnes and Prudential and the written 
correspondence between the parties relating thereto. This offer 
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by Prudential is some indication of the value of the proper~ 
involved. In W. M. Barnes' Deposition he testified that never 
at any time had he agreed or intended to sell property worth 
approximately $ 2, 500, 000 to Sohio for $ 500, 000. If this were 
a straight conveyance to Sohio, as Sohio contends, why would 
the parties have given Sohio the right to meet any other offer 
to purchase the property? Certainly, these allegations of 
Barnes contained in the Pleadings and in the Deposition present 
an issue of material fact which cannot be resolved on Summary 
Judgment. 
The manner in which the parties treated the property in 
their business records and accounting books is also a material 
issue in determining the real nature of the transaction. In 
W. M. Barnes' Deposition, pages 74-77, Mr. Barnes testified 
that plaintiffs accounting books reflected a $500,000 debt 
owed to Sohio by reason of the banks assignment of its interest 
to Sohio under the terms of the agreement. There is no 
indication in the records of how Sohio treated the protierty 
on its books. This then, presents another issue to be dete~ 
mined by the court at trial and not on Summary Judgment. Also, 
the fact that Sohio has never recorded the deed is helpful in 
I 
determining the intention of the parties.' 
CONCLUSION 
··-• h t d by this case 
.cle1if>ly ,. uhoar facts such as t ose presen e 
wherein appellants allege that the transaction in question was 
· was 
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a sale, it is essential in determining the true nature and 
character of the transaction that all material facts be fully 
developed and presented by the parties through all legal avenues 
available, including trial. An examination of the Pleadings 
and other documents on file in this case has revealed that there 
are many factual disputes in this case relating to factors 
on which the court, in prior cases, have placed great emphasis 
in determining the true nature and character of the transaction 
involved. In a case such as this one where appellant stands 
to forfeit all its interest in property valued at many times 
the amount of the debt secured, it is especially important 
that all issues and facts be fully developed and that the 
testimony of the parties and other witnesses by heard by the 
trier of fact. 
The disputed issues as to material facts raised by the 
Pleadings, Affidavits, Depositions and other documents on file 
herein are sufficient so as to render the granting of Summary 
Judgment by the trial court under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure inappropriate. The facts and circumstances of this 
case require that a trial be ha~, and that full discovery and 
presentation of the evidence to the court be made. 
DATED this / '1 day of July, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BY ~f.4tRd~ 
DUANE ~ FRANDEN 
Frandsen, Keller & Je11sen 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Professional Building 
90 West 1st North 
Price, Utah 84501 
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